Insurgent tactics - Assault on outpost

In a recent thread on insurgents in Iraq, some posters commented that their tactics “sucks”.

Here is a video that shows what some of these groups are capable of, in terms of carrying out operations; planning, reconnaissance, dry runs and execution.

http://www.funker530.com/al-qaeda-wipes-out-rival-militant-encampment-hd/

Do not underestimate these groups.

Maybe not on this forum, but I’ve called their tactics shitty before.

This shows some minor improvements but still nothing compared to the capability of our warfighters.

The main advantage we have are combat enablers/force multipliers.

They continue to inflict casualties, regardless.

Are you saying that what is shown in this video has little value, and should not be of any concern because we are awesome?
That it tells us nothing of their capabilities, strengths and weaknesses?

Tells me they don’t aim and just shoot wildly into random places where they believe people to be.

Tells me they can drive to the X, which is some we stopped doing a long time ago - granted some units still do it.

I don’t really care either way since these guys are attacking each other.

  1. Engaging known, likely and hidden enemy positions is a common technique, and not indicative of a low/inferior level of training. Shooting into an enclosed space after a grenade is also a valid technique for that AO, as the blast produces a lot of dust. Walking in blind is a lot more dangerous. It has been done by NATO forces in at Afghanistan.

  2. Their method of infiltration worked, as it gave them the element of surprise. I would bet that particular method was chosen after having observed alertness levels and sentry organisation at the objective. This is one technique, they are not a one trick pony. I have been on the receiving end of another technique, where they used a concealed avenue of approach to get in position, and even despite our sniper shooting one guy he observed getting in position first, they managed to open fire simultaneously and mass fires.

  3. They are also engaging our guys down range, and can continue to be the enemy in the next conflict.

Dismissing this video, and continuing to regard the enemy as AK-wielding farmers is not advisable.

You have your point of view, which is fine, I have mine.

I am not going to give credit to some goblins for watching a few youtube vids of marines doing stuff and attempting to emulate them.

I want to see them do this against a US base, bet they tried, go pro and all, since none of them survived there won’t be any video being posted.

As long as they are killing each other I don’t really care.

/unsubscribing due to pointlessness of context.

You’ve always come off as a respectable fellow so I’ll be nice and say I think you’re being a it too kind. As essentially stated by Voodoo sometimes they get it right to an extent and they’re certainly motivated in their own special sort of medieval way, but beyond that they’re little more than sophisticated, cunning rats who always go down fast and hard when they aren’t hiding in the weeds doing sneaky shit.

That whole thing was a sucker-punch. They rolled-up a for what was in all intents, an undefended target.

They didn’t win so much as the other guys forfeited.

How much training in ambush, IED, and combined arms did the Taliban receive from the CIA and SF during Soviet occupation? I have no knowledge of this but wonder sometimes how much of what they know they got from us. Or from Arab militaries we have helped trained. Anyone have insight to this?

This. Some Afghan farmers didn’t wander off a farm one day and decide a complex L-shaped ambush with IED blasts and overlapping fields of fire was how to do it. I’ve seen some pretty legit FOUO/Classified videos of ambushes on US Convoys and they’re definitely not “sophisticated, cunning rats who always go down fast and hard when they aren’t hiding in the weeds doing sneaky shit.”

You’re welcome to your opinion, however I’m sure you’re aware that insurgency isn’t the same war fighting in general. While they may be semi-trained, gutsy insurgents they often prove easy to defeat in direct combat. Which is why I used the sneaky rat analogy. Now if you want to say that’s because they lack ideal numbers, arms and equipment it’s another argument, but even then muslim armies tend to fold rather quickly when confronted by an equal force.

Would you disagree with that assessment?

That’s an interesting way of looking at it.

My take is that they chose their target and course of action based on reconnaissance and intel. Their intent was to inflict casualties, and perhaps scrounge some equipment and finances. They accomplished this with very few casualties.

Yup. Many foreign fighters have also offered their services to AQ and similar groups wrt training and so forth. Foreign fighters with backgrounds from many conflicts, as well as military backgrounds. Some have been from western militaries as well.

The thread was aimed at insurgent tactics. Not opponents who are equally trained and equipped.

May I ask, and I am not being confrontational, what is your personal experience with these groups in direct combat? Background and experience is somewhat difficult to glean from posts and profiles.

Again, I am not commenting solely based on this video. My comments are from personal experience, as well as buddies who have been in more fights than I have.

I know that you unsubscribed due to “pointlessness of context”, but there are two pretty “famous” battles that come to mind:

Battle of Wanat
Battle of Kamdesh (COP Keating)

At Keating, huge efforts were made by ground forces, heavy fires and CAS to hold the position. The fight lasted for 15 hours.
At Wanat, the militants withdrew after 4 hours.

In both cases, insurgents breached the wire. This was against prepared positions, with heavy fires and CAS available.

Coalition troops put down an heroic effort, and is clearly a testament to their ability, but those battles also show the will and ability of the insurgents to execute complex operations.

I’ve got zero military experience to back up my opinion but some of these Afghanis have been fighting with or against the best-trained military units of the two most powerful nations on the planet for thirty-five ****ing years.

I’m guessing they’ve picked up a trick or two.

Ok, so we focus on insurgents only and your initial question is more than fair. The answer to it is no, I have not fought against the referenced individuals. Now if I may ask you something based upon the rest of your commentary.

You started this thread with a pretty clear display of respect for the operation carried out in the video clip, primarily for the tactics you saw in it, yet you then fall back and state that it’s not really all of what you base your opinion on, and then refer to your experience in the field. But that doesn’t indicate what it is about the attack you see as being so effective beyond cutting up 55gal barrels for a fair at best level of concealment and an expected degree of basic preparation.

In other words I’m trying to understand what it really is that prompted you to post this thread, specifically because 15-20 men rushing a small, completely unfortified compound defended by what appears to be roughly six militants isn’t so impressive unto itself.

I also am not looking to be confrontational, just trying to better understand.

A few points on what is shown of their capabilities:

-Reconnaissance of objective prior to attack
-Dress rehearsal/dry run
-Use of sand table for dry run
-Putting effective fire on visible and likely targets (as opposed to blind firing on FA)
-Adequate room clearing techniques
-Surprise and violence of action
-Conducted SSE once objective was taken
-Executed according to plan, and kept momentum up, overran the objective as a coherent unit staying in formation
-Proper CASEVAC plan

It shows a certain degree of professionalism/competence, that contrasts what many people think of wrt these groups - often regarded as clueless, lacking in training, inferior and as you your self stated, won’t stand and fight.

I agree that the video also shows what will happen if your security is piss poor.

One member commented that “they don’t aim and just shoot wildly into random places where they believe people to be”. I ask you to note the first guard that is killed, he is gunned down from a moving vehicle while he himself is moving.

Guess I could have expounded a bit in my first post, rather than the four key words I used to try to get my point across (planning, reconnaissance, dry runs and execution).

Fair enough, but I’d maintain that while the basics were there it was less than spectacular overall. The recon was fine, but even considering the magnification it was within close proximity and therefore likely detectable by a capable group of defenders. But even if not, again 15 men speeding up in trucks to kill about six unprepared and unfortified militants that looked like villagers wandering about probably isn’t the best example for your point despite the dry runs.

Now if their planning had allowed them to take a fortified position with an equal or greater number of defenders then we have something a bit more “respectable”.

I am not sure I understand your reasoning.

They use a force in greater numbers than the enemy to successfully assault an enemy position, and you think it is not indicative of ability? Outnumbering the enemy is a key factor. For normal open terrain operations the ratio should be 3:1, for urban ops 10:1. To put it in context, if the defending force is a squad, then a platoon should be tasked with assaulting the objective.

Assaulting an enemy position, with the enemy forces outnumbering your own and succeeding would be impressive regardless of who it was. It would be a reckless undertaking, nobody in their right mind would order someone to do it.

Would an ambush on a coalition unit out patrolling by a force in greater numbers with say the same result be just as unimpressive? I agree the video clearly demonstrates weaknesses with the defenders, but I don’t neccessarily think that it detracts from my point.

I also think you are confusing the surveillance on the objective that captured the assault itself, and what is most likely intel gained prior to the assault that was used for preparation. Wrt to OP placement, you take what you can get. Distance reduces likelyhood of compromise, but reduces the amount of detail that can be detected. The OP was most likely relaying real time info on sentry movement.

My point isn’t that these guys are sensational, but to not underestimate them, as they are capable of pulling off deliberate attacks. Assaulting an enemy objective with 15 men takes some practice to execute. It is foolish to write it off as luck or incompetent foes.