Increasing small arms lethality in Afghanistan
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA512331&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf
A lot of good info, and just one more article by a subject matter expert pointing out the 800lb gorilla that has been in the room for decades.
The odd thing is that he initially suggested the possibility of a 5.56 that performs better, but if not that then…
It seemed to set the tone. But it was a fascinating, detailed read.
Just started reading, thanks.
Already, in the abstract, it tells me that the Army needs more SDMs or at least more SDM-like training at the Basic level.
from Page 4:
The reorganization of the infantry squad in 1960 eliminated the M1D sniper rifle and resulted in the loss of the precision mid-range capability of the infantry squad. The modern solution to this problem is the squad designated marksman. The concept of the squad designated marksman is that a soldier receives the training necessary to engage targets beyond the 300-meter range limitation of current marksmanship programs, but below the 600 meter capability of actual snipers. As of June 2009, the equipment and training of the squad designated marksman has yet to be standardized. In field manual 3-22.9 there are only fourteen pages dedicated to training the squad designated marksman.
from Field Manual 3-22.9 Rifle Marksmanship:
7-29. MISSION OF THE SQUAD DESIGNATED MARKSMAN
The primary mission of the SDM is to deploy as a member of the rifle squad. The SDM is a vital member of his individual squad and not a squad sniper. He fires and maneuvers with his squad and performs all the duties of the standard rifleman. The SDM has neither the equipment nor training to operate individually or in a small team to engage targets at extended ranges with precision fires.
The secondary mission of the SDM is to engage key targets from 300 to 500 meters with effective, well-aimed fires using the standard weapon system and standard ammunition. He may or may not be equipped with an optic. The SDM must, therefore, possess a thorough understanding and mastery of the fundamentals of rifle marksmanship as well as ballistics, elevation and windage hold-off, sight manipulation, and range estimation.
I find that this resistance, this ‘corporate’ inertia, to quickly embrace individual marksmanship to be, objectively speaking, negligent and, Subjectively speaking, Criminally negligent.
While I do think a better round or caliber would help just by itself I get the impression that much of this is based on the fact we do not control the high ground, and our troops are too over loaded to close with the enemy. To make up for this we need a round that is more accurate, and does more damage at extended ranges.
I do applaud the effort as I always though general weapons and marksmanship training was lacking (which definately can and should be improved)…a better round does nothing to help our guys having to climb billy goat hills, and the fact the Taliban can pick spots on the top of a mountain, and shoot down on our guys. Even 600M, and having an effective cartridge for that range isn’t a “makeup” when you are fighting on 10-16k foot mountains.
More troops, a better round, and basic load weight kept under 40lbs.
Wow - excellent article. Not much there that I hadn’t already devoted brain cells to, but in a very consise (50+ pages) pdf. Sad he didn’t recognise Chuck Santose on the IBSZ.
More focused on change in caliber than improving what is there, but not too far to make it another doc of change.
Great read. Thanks Hop.
some notable parts:
Leaders have a tendency to repeat the things they learned while coming up through the ranks, without questioning the background of the information. One area of misinformation is the idea that it is a necessity of the M16/M4 to be parade-ground clean. Part of this is due to the backlash from the early failures of the M16 in Vietnam. The other reason is a complete lack of education on the weapon systems beyond basic training or the basic officer’s course.79 Contracted trainers, such as Patrick Rogers80 routinely operate rifles that are not cleaned and only have lubrication added to them before the bolt and bolt carrier become dry. Using only additional lubrication, his weapons have fired over 19,000 rounds without mechanical malfunction.
First, sand and dust are going to get into the rifle. At that point, it is better to have lubricated sand and dust then a dry weapon with sand and dust. The test found that the first magazine removed from the individual’s equipment, which was also in the dust chamber, caused over 90 percent of the malfunctions. The problem was that the ammunition and the magazines where sandy and prevented the weapon from fully chambering the first cartridge. Use of the forward assist when inserting a new magazine dramatically increased reliability. This point of failure emphases the importance of the magazine in the proper function of the weapon. The effect of sand in magazines is greatly reduced with modern designs of the M4 magazines, such as the Magpul PMAG.
The magazine is an important part of the rifle. When originally designed by Eugene Stoner, the magazine was meant to be a lightweight, disposable item. Due to this concept, the magazine was made from aluminum and not designed to be durable. Soldiers soon learned that the magazine was not disposable and that care was required to keep the weapon reliable.86 There are several things that soldiers can do to ensure their magazines work.
Several upgrades are available to increase the reliability of the issued magazines. A company called Magpul makes the best upgrades the author has used. Their original product consisted of a slip-on rubber ring for the bottom of the magazine. It made it easier to grasp your magazines from your ammunition pouches but also protected the delicate floor plate tabs, which have a tendency to break after extended use. They also designed a new, anti-tilt follower that greatly increases feeding reliability of the standard issue magazine.
In 2007, the company came out with their own version of a magazine for the M16/M4 known as the PMAG. Constructed of resilient polymer, the magazine is nearly indestructible. (Figure 8) When the polymer cracks or breaks, it is easily recognizable, unlike with the standard issue magazines. These magazines represent the cutting edge of technology for making the rifle more reliable. Recently, the PMAG was assigned a national stock number, so units can now order these magazines through the supply system.87 All combat arms units should consider replacing their standard issue magazines with the much more reliable PMAG.
basically saying they should be zeroing at 50 yards, not 25 yards
The general issue is that doctrine recommends only one way to accomplish a zero for a rifle and no alternative techniques are discussed or recommended. This demonstrates a lack of understanding of ballistics and the importance of different battlesight zeros. Since it is now understood that the M16/M4 is most lethal within 200 meters, the standard battlesight zero should reflect that understanding. Zeroing the rifle or carbine at a distance of 50 meters will keep the maximum ordinate of the M855 round within one inch of the point of aim from 25 meters to 200 meters, where is crosses the line of sight again. This zero combined with the accuracy potential of the ammunition and the shooter will keep the strike of rounds within the chest area of a target out to a distance of 250 meters. This zero can provide lethal hits out to a distance of 320 meters, with rounds impacting in the vascular region of the lower abdomen and groin.
Another concept of the qualification course that is outdated, is the requirement to fire one round per target. This requirement remains in the current version of the marksmanship manual. It programs soldiers to believe that one round that hits the target will be enough to incapacitate or kill them or that if they miss the target, that they should stop engaging it. This flawed mental training is evident in a report prepared by the Marines addressing combat marksmanship. In it, the interviewer learned that Marines believed that they had hit the enemy numerous times and the 5.56-mm cartridge had failed to incapacitate the threat. In areas were the enemy was eventually killed or captured, the Marines learned that what they thought were hits, were actually misses. In several instances Marines called their shots as a center of mass hit and upon finding the enemy realized that their hits where in an extremity and not life threatening
Criticisms of the reliability of the M4 result from a lack of effective doctrine and training. A renewed focus on the actual requirements for maintaining the M4 carbine will result in improved performance and confidence in the weapon. Reliability of the system can be drastically increased with the use of new magazines such as the Magpul PMAG or the careful maintenance and slight modification of the aluminum magazine. Lubrication and dust testing continues to favor CLP as the best overall lubricant and a generous application of lubrication on the primary wear points of the bolt and bolt carrier for operations in sandy environments. Periodic replacement of high wear parts such as the extractor, bolt, and action spring will keep the weapon operational almost indefinitely.
Outstanding article. Thanks for sharing.
Great. Started reading it at 11PM and couldn’t quit. Much of it was old news but well worth revisiting. Three things jumped out at me: the percentage of incidents involving ranges over 300 yds (50%!); the high ground/terrain issues; and the personal mobility problem. Makes perfect sense though; I live in northern WY where conditions are similar, and my load-carrying capabilities are unfortunately diminishing.
I am just finishing one of the “Great Courses” (www.TEACH12.com) on “The Art of Critical Decision Making” which is very good. What a case study this would make!
Thanks for posting this. Assuming there are no copyright issues I’m thinking of getting a copy printed off and bound for my library.
This is a very well laid out “study” of a subject that has been going on since our launch of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001. It was almost the first thing that came out was that the 5.56 didn’t the effective ranges our guys were facing in Afghanistan. Springfield then received orders for the M-14 to bring the 7.62 into the fray. Then came the 6.8mm. I’m sure everyone here can focus on the time-lines with this, but it is sad the Army hasn’t really learned the big lesson.
What is interesting here that the study is primarily about the Army’s current doctrine, not the Marine’s. From my understanding is that to this day the leathernecks still are qualifying out to 500 meters. it would be very interesting to create a study on how the longer range training of the Marine Corp ranks with the current Army standards while both are in theater.
I also agree that our troops need to be weighed down less. I’ve never participated in the Army, or any other infantry, but with that said, I don’t see myself, even in better shape, marching to conflict with all the gear I’ve seen our troops carry and expect to fight afterward without a day’s rest? And we all no Murphy won’t allow that. I don’t understand why we aren’t doing more helo infills, or vehicle infills, set up FOP’s, and then begin the mission of routing out the Taliban while securing diplomatic relations with the locals. I know the inherent problems of getting resupplied out in those areas, but we aren’t dealing with a force on force enemy, but an insurgency.
Better training, open arms room, lighter loads, new doctrine. Simple as that.
To the OP, thank you for providing the link. SAMS studies always make fascinating reading.
I agree with Mauser KAR98K. My first thought was what differences are apparent in the field, based on the different training doctrines of those two branches?
Bless the young men and women in harms way, and remember to keep them all in your prayers.
Excellent article Hop, and I must say, about fuckin time. This article should be required reading at every NCO and Officer course, and every Company Grade Officer and NCO prior to deployment.
One of my first thoughts also went along the Army training vs. USMC training.
Whenever I’ve read about M4/M16 complaints they seem to be Army related.
Is the USMC better at keeping it internal or is the training difference the key?
I’m leaning toward the training difference and the mentality difference: “Every Marine a Rifleman”
There was an article that explained USMC marksmanship was geared more towards competition shooting, at known distances to 500M, and the Army’s was geared towards pop up targets to 300M, also known distance shooting. Both programs were criticized as being unrealistic to the fluid dynamics of the battlefield.
Shooting out to 500M ain’t that hard, but it does eat into training time and resources, to get an individual up to the level of proficiency, to effectively engage NEPUTS (Non Electrical Pop Up Targets) at that distance.
Great post. Thanks.
I hear ya. 
I’d like to see a similar paper as the one in the op for the USMC.
Is there one out there by any chance?
The Marines have their own ‘SDM’ the SAM, squad advanced marksman.
First time I ever heard this:
The problem was that the ammunition and the magazines where sandy and prevented the weapon from fully chambering the first cartridge. Use of the forward assist when inserting a new magazine dramatically increased reliability.
Ive experienced this…basically I think the weapon and ammo being exposed to the elements crap builds up, and the 1st cartridge doesn’t want to chamber. Hit the forward assist a couple times, and it goes into battery. The shooting of the 1st round blows the crud out so the next rounds chamber fine.
At least in Kuwait and s Iraq there is a lot of that talcum like sand/dust which is so fine it gets into everything especially when the wind is blowing. Really doesn’t take long for it to build up inside a weapon. One of the many reasons a least a daily wipe down is criitical to keeping things up and running…but when you are outside all day, and then go to chamber a round it can happen.
Me too. I’ve never ever used it, or had to. Why would anyone want to jam something that’s already jammed, further into the chamber, is beyond me.
I think the result of contaminated weapons and mags are from the individual Soldiers and Marines, laying mags and weapons in the dirt, on the rim of their fighting position. Then complain the M-4s are junk after the fact. Simply leaving mags in their pouches and using a little care with the weapon, would cut contamination dramatically.