This one appears to be about to go off of the rails, and while I’m not persuaded that there is any one non-controversial answer to the questions posed in the opening post, I think we can do better than going after each other with inflammatory rhetoric. If you’re feeling the urge to blow someone’s face off here, please stay out of the thread altogether.
On a personal level, I was abroad when the September 11th attacks came, and watched the road to war from a foreign land where well-intentioned friends and neighbors often asked me to help make some sense of what they were seeing in the news. Admittedly, it didn’t make a lot of sense to me at the time (or, more accurately, it seemed like a pretty disproportional response based upon what we could glean from public sources), but my standard reply was that I believed that our government “knew some things that I/we did not” about what was happening in that part of the world, and that was about as much as I really needed to know, as my part in the equation was to follow orders – not to debate the political merits of the cause.
Looking back after having spent no little time in the region myself, I still believe that what we thought we knew provides a relevant context for understanding how we got there. There was plenty of reason to suspect that Mr. Hussein’s government possessed, or was in active pursuit of, the weapons in question. Some of them had actually been used, and the evidence was clear that there was strong official interest in others. We now know that many of the actual details were fabricated to keep the Iranians in check, but for our part, I’m not sure that the price of being wrong and intervening anyway wasn’t preferable to the price of being right and doing nothing. Call it an intelligence failure if you like, but even that strikes me as an over-simplification, and I’m not comfortable with one-size-fits-all criticisms of our national resolve that come well after-the-fact. We thought we knew what we we getting into, and it was serious enough to take action. We may not have been entirely right, but neither were we entirely wrong. In either case, a despot with visions of a powerful new Caliphate was laid low, and we gave Jihadists a regional focal point for engagement that didn’t involve further attacks on our mainland. Did we gain in other ways? Sure. Did we lose in other ways? Sure. War is rarely the neat, tidy thing that we all envision it to be from our history classes or books. To suggest otherwise is to broadcast a rather startling naivety.
I read some very good analysis from the founder of the private intelligence company Stratfor* a year or two ago that really put all of this into sharp relief: America did not need to “win” in Iraq (or Afghanistan) in the traditional military sense in order to score a decisive victory. Our involvement in these campaigns has totally de-stabilized the efforts of those extremists and/or political opportunists seeking to unify the Islamic world against the West. As cold as it might sound, as long as the Arab/Islamic world remains in a state of relative disarray (i.e. factional infighting with no consolidation of power under any one ruler/dictator/Imam/Ayatollah), they are consigned to irrelevance and we win. There are other metrics by which one might seek to evaluate these wars, of course, but in the final analysis, our blood and treasure defused a pretty significant time bomb.
Me? I’m far more interested in where things appear to be headed with North Korea. Or, to take a longer-term view, with Mexico.
AC
- Source: The Next 100 Years by George Friedman. I highly recommend adding this title to your holiday reading list.