this is neither new news or that radical. I was reading articles about this change in the new equipment over a year ago.
Likewise, some are making assumptions that these units will be amphibious landed via surface ships.
The proposed JLTV based equipment is well within the lift capabilities of Navy / Marine helos, much less army heavy lift.
As such they could be helo dropped onto Islands (or foreign country) without having to do traditional amphibious approaches. Current Sea Stallions can sling load 21,000 pounds for 110 nautical miles, or something like that.
They are replacing Marine tank units as I understand it, which while controversial, has not been used in Maritime / Marine focused roles for some time. (With apologies to any Marine tankers out there)
So I actually see this as a sharpening of focus to likely scenarios marines might encounter.
USMC is focused on lightweight and mobile. From the document:
“This includes the establishment of three Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs) over the next several years with a focus on the Indo-Pacific region. The MLRs are a light, expeditionary, and low signature Stand-in Force built to operate in littoral, or shoreline warfare zones.”
Just sharing the rationale that I read for the last several months, which initially did not make sense but does if you think about it a bit. Especially in Asia. I am not an expert in things USMC, or really anything. At first I thought it was the bad idea fairy, but now it makes more sense.
These units are not your traditional Marine ground pounder, the other meu’s still fill that role.
As I understand it, these units are intended to help keep sea lanes clear so that the other kind of marine and navy resources could be deployed.
Yes, airlifting is a chore, but it’s a powerful capability. My understanding is a super stallion can sling load 36,000 lb. From memory a JLTV dry is 16, 000 and with fully grossed out maxes about 21,000 lb. I don’t know what the new missile ones will weigh, but I can’t imagine it would be near or over 36,000 lb on a JLTV chassis.
But they can also roll off amphibious transport.
Likewise, the intent isn’t that they would be advancing hundreds of miles, once dropped they would move to points on the island. Yes they will need fuel blivets, but all vehicles do.
Again, these are replacing tank units and are intended to be used in the emerging Asia maritime environment.
It’s not a big stretch to reach the conclusion that what they are describing would be far more useful than tanks around the South China sea.
Too true - I think this is also probably the tacit admission of the LCAC not really being all that capable - although they will probably try and demonstrate the ability to fire these off the deck of one. If it only serves to establish a beachhead, the maneuver warfare aspects just mean a traditional WW2 era beachhead is really no different than sitting in a doorway if you’re entering a building - get through the funnel and onto better things, or else meet your demise, and the other logistics train could be better handled with most anything else for the weight/space/cost tradeoffs.
Having an organization like a MEU(SOC) that is patrolling that area (DirstyWorst, etc.) that has these and brings them along to cross-train with every exercise is probably the best way to share the love with our friends who have claims in the Spratly Is., so whatever janky CONOP they might have envisioned for this, it does really exist for shoving the cost calculus farther into the high pain threshold, and pushing OPFOR maritime ISR capabilities far enough back that we can retain information overmatch and just keep hitting them from outside until they just can’t do it anymore… which seems to be a preset-day theme
The new CH-53K King Stallion has a payload of 35,000 pounds (sling 27K), is bigger, and can go further. They designed it in part to achieve batter capability in semi/non-permissive environments.
Yes, they got rid of armor (as well as MP units, my beloved 8th Marines, bridging, replacing heavy arty with missile tech), and redesigning some of the ‘standard’ units to more MAGTF-centric littoral units.
They are redesigning to be more maneuverable, go into semi/non-permissive environments, do their thing, and get out.
The missile tech is just a small part of it, it’s just a tool. The bigger picture is the paradigm shift of doctrine.
This is the part that makes the least sense to me. For starters, when in the history of the Marines has the destruction of surface ships (beyond small boats like the IRGC uses) been in their Op Order? Marines train to seize ships and hold them for the Navy, whereas the Navy does the sinking jobs. Likewise, who is going to control these things? Some tank commander equivalent in the field within visual range of the JLTV? Or some joystick jockey back on the ship or at a relatively safe command post hundreds of miles away? Because unlike a drone, you’re not going to drive a JLTV back to the launch point when the mission is completed or changes. Also unlike a drone, these will be on the ground in contested areas. That means they’ll require concealment while waiting and security to prevent sabotage. Who’s hanging out to provide that and if they are, why not just make it a manned system?
So a couple of questions come to mind. Is this project getting greenlit based on the sinking of the Moskva from shore based defenses? Is it being greenlit as a specific deterrent to CCP aggression against Taiwan and other regional allies? If so, I’d think this would be more of an export item, or something operated by a technical version of the Green berets. Either way, I just don’t see it as all that beneficial to the shoot & maneuver elements of the USMC? JMO, YMMV
This capability was announced publicly at least a year ago as being the direction and underdevelopment. That’s when I first read about it just in the regular news.
So it’s not a reaction, though recent events may have increased tension and priority.
Roger on all Chuckman, makes sense.
Edit: I do think it was in response to the ever-increasing aggression in the China Sea, with their artificial islands and such. It’s an overall direction for the Marines as I understand it, just for the Asia area.
According to CMC the shift in doctrine goes back to the pre-WW2 version of the Corps, to be lighter, more mobile, and more maneuverable; in concert with the Navy. I don’t think that this shift from being ‘Army lite’ and China’s shenanigans are a coincidence. In fact, they plain said the changes are because of peer/near-peer competitors specific to China.
I am not up on the current tech, JLTV, missiles, etc., but it’s my opinion that they are having to take on some of that role because of the disrepair of the Navy over the past many years. We simply don’t have a Navy that can protect a regiment-size landing force in more than one location, let alone have the ships to actually carry a Marine force that size.
This was in the works years ago, I don’t think the Moskva had any impact on the decision making (but I can see depending on which side of the issue one is on to use that incident to support or refute the changes). The Marine Littoral Regiments are specific to the Pacific and Asia and won’t replace (I don’t think) the MEU(SOC) afloat in the Med, Caribbean, Africa, and Indian Ocean, so definitely focused on China.
I don’t have a dog in the fight; I have been out of the mil for a while now so following peripherally. Some of the changes I like, some I do not. I know a battalion commander in Hawaii who said that a lot of his contemporaries are holding their noses and swallowing the medicine, so I do not think that the en blanc changes are going over too well.
Slight aside but related regarding changes, everyone I know is big on the growth of the infantry Marine. The model makes it look more like the Royal Marines with a lot more training and even more decentralizing command authority down the chain of command. If they pull of that plan, that would be good.
My observation is that the norm for “infantry” is shifting as well… Even very light infantry (paratroopers) now has a very strong emphasis and loadout for anti-armor.
Others live in that world and have more info. I just know my son saw this change during his IN LT PL & XO time in the herd in Eastern europe. A very big pivot away from a’stan mindset towards near peer. This required changing a lot of muscle memory and institutional mindset.
Anti armor (javelin?) and even manpads were considered required core skills for the rank and file Joes.
Now in a mech unit, apparently there’s even more emphasis on anti armor, and even maneuver of the fighting vehicles to position for the armor/mech threat.
So to me, the Marines growing a mobile land-based anti-ship capability is due to a similar pivot. For similar reasons.
And very easy to drop on the zillion tiny Islands surrounding Taiwan as needed.
BTW, I don’t think this means that the era of the rifleman or even tank is over. It’s just that the emphasis shifted. One example is significantly increased focus on optics even for light infantry, etc.
I hadn’t factored that into my assessment, so it does make more sense in that light. I guess that’s the perk of being a Reagan Marine during the (almost) 600 ship Navy era. Most of them were well kept. Well, except the USS Trenton (LPD-14). That thing was a garbage scow compared to the other ships I served on.
