extra two cents… When the Army implements new systems, the bottom line should come down to two key points of value (ROI if you will)
- Does this system result in more dead bad guys?
- Does this system result in fewer friendly casualties?
Its hard to justify anything if it can’t do one of those two things.
Signature reduction is already a proven force multiplier
Full-auto, while it does waste ammo–also provides a limited automatic rifleman capability to every member of the squad with an M4A1.
From there you have to decide if the increased cost to the supply chain is going to support the ROI. Producing systems that increase the failure rate of a system has a negative impact on the unit’s readiness.
Part of the reason SoF gets so many of the toys, is not just a matter of funding–you’re looking for those extra one and two percentile advantages. The cost ratio of one SoF vs. one Infantryman is substantial. Don’t kid yourself when it comes down to the dollars and cents being factored into these types of decisions. Its like Ford and Chevy choosing not to fix exploding gas tank issues. They determined it was cheaper to pay for the deaths than a recall.
The same type of logic comes into play with defense spending. It’s a sad but true reality of modern warfare. We’re still one of the best equipped forces on earth and current generation 11Bs are substantially revalued vs. previous conflicts.
If you look at the number of supporting personnel required to field just one infantryman, that one meat eater represents a significant investment in time and material. However, that one infantryman vs. the training value/expense of one SoF soldier is a radically higher ratio. You can turn and burn Infantryman into a conflict in matter of months. SoF forces take years to develop to fully functional assets and then require significant investments in R&D for equipment and follow-on training to retain that edge/capability. Almost any and every edge that keeps a SoF operator alive longer or results in a higher kill ratio is money with real RoI attached.
That same money when expended on a “Big Army” scale does not always follow.
An example of how that might work is thermal optics, putting one in the hands of every 11B on a front line would be cost prohibitive in terms of the advantage the optic delivers. However, at the small unit level with high value/limited scope scenarios that capability might be the difference between mission failure or success. Here is where all those extra percentiles start adding up.
Another way to look at that situation would be is it more cost effective to buy something like an Apache vs. increasing the capability of an Infantry unit? In the ultimate scheme of things, every component has its own value/detractions. In some cases, the value inherent to Infantry is having boots on the ground at a lower cost than say moving in armor. The level of asset that needs to be committed to maintain/hold the mission objective with the least cost while still being flexible to maneuver is part of the complexity.
It would be great if every infantryman had all the same gear options as a SEAL, had A10s and AH64s for CAS 100% of the time and could call in MLRS on any target on a the battlefield. The reality is even with the economic power of the United States, we cannot maintain that level of integration to every unit at all times in support of every mission.
Every unit has to compete for resources, which ultimately comes down to how much does it cost in dollars and cents. Sometimes those dollars and cents can get blood stained.
