The Pentagon’s Culture of Risk-Aversion and the Infantry Automatic Rifle (IAR) Solici

General General Discussion
1

Very interesting read:

“To put it simply,” said one insider who wished to remain anonymous, “the Marines fucked up.”

He was speaking of the Marine Corp’s ongoing Infantry Automatic Rifle (IAR) solicitation, which intends to replace the infantry’s M249 squad automatic weapon (SAW) with a lighter, more maneuverable machine gun better suited to close quarters urban combat that will continue to be the predominant battle space of the twenty-first century. The first round of the selection process has been completed, and candidates from FN Herstal and Colt Defense have advanced. Both are well-established players in the defense industry, but the choice was not without controversy.

In recent months, there has been no shortage of aspersions cast towards the Pentagon’s weapons procurement process. A common complaint is that high-tech, big-ticket weapons systems like the F-22 and the FCS are inappropriate for combating low-tech global insurgencies. Other analysts have critiqued the Department of Defense’s freewheeling spending and lack of accountability. In one notable example, journalist David Axe, author of War Bots, has pointed to the private sector and the use of lead systems integrators (LSI) as a source of the most egregious oversights in Defense Department procurement. There is some indication that reform is on the horizon. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has put contractors on notice that “the spigot of defense funding opened by 9/11 is closing.”

However, there has been little said about how institutional culture of the Pentagon affects weapons buying. Culture—particularly mapping “the human terrain”—has become an important lens to examine our enemies, but rarely do we turn that lens on ourselves. Most famously, John Nagl examined the institutional cultures of the British military and the American military in order to understand why one succeeded and the other failed to defeat insurgencies in Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife. As we will see, the IAR solicitation demonstrates a latent cultural phenomenon within the military that might be keeping the best weapons systems from reaching American warfighters.

As I have written before in “Technology, Risk Aversion, and Counterinsurgency,” risk aversion can make a serious impact on the choices the military makes not only about strategy and tactics but also equipment. This institutional culture within the US military has, at times, left soldiers overburdened for effective counterinsurgency praxis. The IAR solicitation gives some clue as to how this same mindset impacts procurement.

The most controversial element of the solicitation has been its exclusion of smaller, innovative companies from the latter stages of competition. It is not an uncommon consideration to select companies based on their capacity to manufacture and deliver weapon systems in the quantities and time frame that the DoD requires, but the IAR solicitation goes a step further. According to the criteria laid out in Marine Corps de-briefs, candidates must have “[m]inimal experience in large government weapons contracts of IAR size and scope.” However, this factor alone eliminates all small companies, leaving a cadre of defense contractors only one of which is an American-based company, Colt.

One company that was eliminated was Knight’s Armament Company in Titusville, Florida. A leader in innovation, KAC developed a rail interface for the M4A1 and M16A4. Previously, operators had used duct tape to affix flashlights and other mission-critical tools to their weapons. Today, militaries all over the world use this system to attach everything from vertical foregrips to infrared illuminators to their weapons. Knight’s also manufactures the US Army’s M110 semi-automatic sniper rifle.

According to founder and CEO of Knight’s Armament, C. Reed Knight, Jr., the IAR solicitation has proven to be another red flag for contractors in already uncertain times.

“I spent somewhere close to $200,000 in responding to the RFP,” he said. “If they are going to disqualify me because they thought I was too small of a company or that I was not up to speed, then they should have put those qualifications up front so that we could have looked at that up front qualification and we could have made a judgment whether we wanted to respond to that or not.”

“I will guarantee you that the people that made the decision on that IAR not one of them have ever stepped foot in my factory. More importantly, we have more CNC table space [within the United States] than Saco Defense, Colt, and FN all added together,” said Mr. Knight. “I just feel like if they told me that they didn’t like my gun because it was the wrong color or if was too little, too light, too heavy or whatever, that is one thing, but they disqualified—partially disqualified—it because of us as a manufacturer.”

“Of the companies that they accepted to the second level, H&K does not have to my knowledge an M- gun,” Knight continued. “I do have one. I have an M110. I have a US Army type-classified rifle, yet H&K does not, but H&K moved to the next level. Now, I could cry over spilt milk, but all those things being said, it has just cautioned me on how I bid on my next RFP, and basically that’s what it all boils down to.”

LWRC International was another small company excluded from the second round. Their candidate utilized the same ergonomics of the M4 while employing new features such as a cleaner and cooler short-stroke piston as well as the ability to fire from a closed or open bolt. LWRC has also deployed a surface conversion process that exceeds traditional anodizing and chrome lining. This rifle was featured on the third season premier of Discovery’s Future Weapons:

According to Darren Mellors, LWRC’s Vice President of Business Development, there is another factor that makes the Marines reluctant to choose small companies and innovative, new weapon systems: risk aversion.

“Often times, junior officers—say, a major—are in charge of the selection, and they don’t want to hang their hat on anything but a sure thing,” he said. “If the design fails or the company can’t deliver, their career is over, so they choose the system that involves the least risk.”

Initiatives like the Marine Enhancement Program (MEP) and Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI) have taken a chance on smaller companies who have provided innovative solutions to meet the needs of soldiers on the ground. However, procurement still involves a process better suited for the industrial age rather than the information age at a time when product development may only take a few months. Complex procurement systems may be suited to complex weapons, but current processes have failed to balance government oversight and fast-paced innovation. More importantly, the current system fails to reward small companies that operate at this pace.

To offset this disadvantage, some companies have allied themselves with larger companies. Recently, MagPul Industries partnered with Bushmaster Firearms, itself a recent acquisition of private equity giant Cerebrus Capital Management.

“We’re more of a fast-paced entity,” said Eric Burt, product designer for Magpul. “We’re going in knowing it’s an uphill battle [for smaller companies]. They don’t know us, our capacity, or our quality control.”

Even if the Pentagon does realize the value of “betting” on smaller companies, small companies themselves may no longer be willing to take the risk in the current climate.

“I have been very fortunate in that I have put a lot of effort, a lot of guestimation, a lot of capital into what I saw as the future and the numbers that I bet on—whether it be red or blacks—I’ve been more right than I’ve been wrong,” said Mr. Knight. “That’s not what I see in the future. I am totally confused. I don’t have any idea where it’s going from here, and I don’t know which color to bet on. It could come up double-aughts or single-aughts green just as easily as red or black.”

According to Mr. Knight, there are a variety of forces contributing to this atmosphere of uncertainty among defense contractors.

“Mixed signals. Lack of adult supervision. The Marine Corps IAR is a perfect example,” Mr. Knight continued. “The economy is in disarray. The military climate is in disarray. We’ve already seen an incredible shift from Republican to Democrat, and that political shift has got an entrepreneur, a capitalist, like myself looking at a very socialist-looking economy and saying I don’t want to give up, I don’t want to take a chance at giving up anything I have. I’m just going to sit tight. I don’t need to take the risk. I have no need to continue betting. I have what I have and what I have is safe if I don’t bet it on the next game. I’m not going to double down, because it looks too uncertain.”

“I’m sure I’m not the only one thinking like this,” he said.

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Direct link:

http://weaponizedculture.wordpress.com/2009/03/04/the-pentagons-culture-of-risk-aversion/

3

When someone writes things like this, they exhibit their lack of strategic thinking.

Just because we are involved in these types of conflicts now, does not mean that this is the only threat we will face for the next 30+ years, which is the life of a fighter. The air superiority fighters that we have now will have to be retired long before. Even if they were not, they are not up to meeting future threats with the level of superiority that they once had.

As far as money for small arms replacement, DocGkr made a very telling statement that the Defense Dept spends more money on PC replacement every year than they do on small arms.

“Often times, junior officers—say, a major—are in charge of the selection, and they don’t want to hang their hat on anything but a sure thing,” he said. “If the design fails or the company can’t deliver, their career is over, so they choose the system that involves the least risk.”

and then:

To offset this disadvantage, some companies have allied themselves with larger companies. Recently, MagPul Industries partnered with Bushmaster Firearms, itself a recent acquisition of private equity giant Cerebrus Capital Management.

Given the quality of Bushmaster products, can you blame them?

As for the rest of his statement, some of it sounds good in theory. It also sounds like sour oats.

I would wager that I have put more rounds through both LWRCs and HK416s than the author of that piece.

4

While disqualifying manufacturers so early isn’t exactly a smart move, I think HK probably had this one in the bag.

5

I just don’t understand the pick of HK for this when they could have picked a Colt based weapon system to standardize and harmonize with the M4 and M16.

The HK system has little in common with a traditional AR15 based system and parts logistics and interchangeability are more of an problem by choosing the HK.

I also think the M249 should be replaced by the Stoner LMG.

And Knight does have a point. HK has never had one of its products adopted for standardized use by the US military.

6

I never knew the reasons why the Stoner LMG was dropped after Vietnam. From what I read of the accounts by the SEALs who used them they loved their Stoners…to me that speaks volumes.

BTT

It seems as if the Corp is taking a step backward on this one…

7

The Stoner 63 was tested by the military, fairly extensively it seems. Most of the reports (actual technical evaluation reports) I have seen, say that it did not perform satisfactorily.

The KAC version, called “Stoner LMG” is different, but also not in production according to KAC on their website.

8

Seriously?

Seriously?

Right now, today, there is no national strategy to deal with Islamic Terrorism. In fact, the Nation Command Authority seems incapable of developing strategy beyond fighting the USSR across the Fulda Gap.

Of course, there is that nice bit of strategy they worked on that looked at how ‘Global Climate Change’ may affect future ops. eyeroll

A nation’s army is a reflection of it’s culture. Americans love technology. We feel that every problem has a technological solution. Everyone in the DoD is pitching their favorite pet project and war toy. What we need is a phase shift in thinking.

Truthfully, an ODA with basic M4’s and a couple million dollars of OPFUND can do more to shape the face of the battlefield than any F-22 or other Pentagon toy ever could.

Of course, if we changed the status quo at the Pentagon, where would all of those retired Generals get their six figure contracting jobs?

9

Seriously, read the rest of my post which stated:

“Just because we are involved in these types of conflicts now, does not mean that this is the only threat we will face for the next 30+ years, which is the life of a fighter. The air superiority fighters that we have now will have to be retired long before. Even if they were not, they are not up to meeting future threats with the level of superiority that they once had.”

Truthfully, an ODA with basic M4’s and a couple million dollars of OPFUND can do more to shape the face of the battlefield than any F-22 or other Pentagon toy ever could.

If that is the case when it came time to invade Iraq in 1990 and 2003 why did we need all of those cold war toys like M1 Tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles with air superiority and air strikes provided by other cold war toys like F-15s and stealth fighters and bombers?

Silly pentagon. They should have sent a bunch of ODA’s in.

While we are at it, should we scrap our nuclear attack submarines? Since according to your logic, every conflict we will face in the future will resemble what we now face in Iraq and Afghanistan. No need for naval superiority. Who cares that we are an island nation? Haji doesn’t have a navy.

The problem with this is while some weapon systems are not used in current conflicts, who is to say what type of future conflicts we might face that require them? Do you think the designers of the M1 Tank, Bradley fighting vehicle or F-15 ever imagined that they would be used to fight the Iraqis in two conflicts?

Weapons systems take a while to develop and procure and introduce into service. Then they may serve for decades. You can’t just go to the fighter store and buy them when you need them and have them ready to go immediately.

10

So a company which has provided countless rails for SOCOM and other branches as well as an entire weapon system (M110) to the Army was rejected on the grounds that they had no demonstrable experience servicing government contracts of this size & scope? That sounds fishy.

LWRC International was another small company excluded from the second round.

And by the description provided by one of their own people, it failed to meet a bright-line accuracy requirement. As anyone familiar with solicitations at this level can tell you, failing one go/no-go test is all it takes.

“Often times, junior officers—say, a major—are in charge of the selection, and they don’t want to hang their hat on anything but a sure thing,” he said. “If the design fails or the company can’t deliver, their career is over, so they choose the system that involves the least risk.”

And this is bad why? They’re selecting a weapon system that thousands of Marines’ lives will depend on. How is it wrong to want on which has the least risk of design failure or delivery problems?

11

Seriously? Do you want enemy CAS to light your ass up like a Christmas Tree?

That is what the lack of Air Superiority means. The F-15 first flew in 1972 and there are far too few F-22’s.

12

The true is that since ww2 the serious killing is done by airforce and artilery, not by rifles.
It makes sense to invest more in the next generation air superiority fighter than in next rifle. With the skies clear of enemy aircraft the enemy is blind and at the mercy of our CAS.
And to be honest I don’t find the IAR to be such a vital tool anyway.

F-15 was a great tool for a long time, but now any country can buy cheap advanced Russian Sukhoi fighters that match and in some ways even excede the F-15. They can always make them cheaper than us, so F-22 is needed if we want to stay on top.
Trying to complete a mission while being bombed, strafed and monitored by enemy airpower sucks, and no rifle in the world can make you feel safe.

13

An Air Force never won a war, but it keeps you from losing a war, just ask Britian and Israel. If you can’t lose, the only thing you can do is win.

14

The Colt IAR uses the same lower and stock parts. It also doesn’t have that proprietary HK416 rail height.

15

Because a major might not have the firearm experience that some might think is necessary.

16

Personally, I would have fielded 500 of each weapon that met the performance specs and had the soldiers evaluate them a year afterwards. That’s thorough testing.

17

True, but I believe the line of thinking is that what we have now is so much better than what our likely rivals have that we can start leapfrogging ahead i.e. develop the tech but not do a full scale production and still move ahead to the next generation. It’s like building a prototype to prove the concept and then move ahead to build on what you’ve learned without making a fleet of the experimental design that has proved itself.

Look at the Comanche attack helicopter that was supposed to replace the Apache helicopter. They made a better helicopter and then found they didn’t need to produce it. Based on the lessons learned from the Comanche, they can design the next generation beyond it without having to go through the expense of producing a bunch of Comanche attack helicopters.

Whether we field the F-15 or the F-22, we have air superiority. While the F-22 is truly impressive in certain aspects, we could have probably skipped production and simply moved to the next generation while using what we already have inventory. That’s not to say that we never move to full production of a good design but given our current threats and projected threats / rivals over the next five to ten years we’d probably have plenty of lead time to build the most current design of a plane we needed. Whether we’d have the necessary money later is a different story.

It’s becoming too expensive to do full production and maintenance of every generation of tech especially when the equipment is not needed. In a sense, we need to be able to scale up when needed to conserve resources (since we don’t have unlimited funds) instead of operating at maximum size all the time.

18

I don’t agree with this considering how long it takes to field a new fighter. The issue is that planes like the F-15, while great in their time, does not have the edge over advanced Sukois SU-27/35 type models. It also doesn’t have the edge over the Frnch Raphael and Eurofighter which could wind up being sold to and used by a future foe.

The other issue is the frame wear on the current fighters. Regardless of how good the plane is, it’s frame has a finite life and can only be rebuilt so many times.

No one is claiming that we need the F-22 for Iraq or Afghanistan–but other conflicts that may come up in the next decades. This is why the whole “we don’t need it for Iraq or Afghanistan” argument is a huge red herring and a false argument.

19

Do you honestly think a lone O4 wrote the SOW, wrote the evaluation protocol, wrote the source selection plan, assessed the results, and made the award?

But I’m sure a handful of guys on an internet forum are far more qualified to address the current and future small arms needs of the USMC.

20

Yeah!!! Todd’s on our side!!!