Anyone read this? I’m reading it now. Part I enjoy most is his use of specific battles from all over the world going back just about as far as recoded history allows. I was going to write a review, but found this guys summed it up well:
Noted Military Historian Bevin Alexander’s latest effort represents an expansion of BH Liddell Hart’s work. In his classic text on strategy, Liddell Hart differentiates between direct and indirect methods of warfare, and finds the latter to be by far the more successful approach. Liddell Hart does not examine different types of indirect action, however, and this is where Alexander’s work comes in. Alexander begins with the premise that frontal assaults against fortified positions should never be attempted. Attacks should always come from the side or rear. This has the advantage of striking the enemy where they are weaker, and perhaps more importantly, it throws them off psychologically, disorienting, and frightening them. Alexander lists thirteen such variations on these same ideas, such as encirclement, holding in one place and striking another, creating diversions, cutting of the enemy’s retreat, etc. Each method receives its own chapter, accompanied by several historical examples of the successful execution of the tactic, usually taken from as many different eras as possible. Of particular note are the examples taken from Stonewall Jackson’s campaigns, a subject on which Alexander is one of the leading authorities. In writing this work it seems clear that Alexander is trying to place himself in line with the classics of military theory: Sun-Tzu, Clausewitz, Liddell Hart. Only time will tell whether or not he achieves this lofty goal. In the meantime there is little doubt that this fascinating and well-written work should be closely examined military strategists, historians, and armchair generals.
Review by E. Gartman (Rockville, MD USA)
I have attempted to read what I can where I can on military history, strategy, etc., but one could spend their entire life reading on the topic and still only scratch the surface. I found this book does a great job of pulling a huge amount of information into concise examples of strategies that have been used through all time, and how they play out, or don’t.
You need to read Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, edited by Peter Paret.
It’s the most concise explanation of how we got where we are that you will find, and it suffers from no American focus; you will find careful explanations from time periods and locations that America typically ignores.
Ever wonder about the evolution of Russian strategy in the latter part of the 19th century? About interbellum tank doctrine? Read this book.
“I want you to remember that no bastard ever won a war by dying for his country. He won it by making the other poor, dumb bastard die for his country.”
-George Patton
I will check it out some time. How Wars are Won is more a general overall look at the major strategies that have been used to win wars that repeat themselves all through history, and is applied (albeit loosely) to current day. It’s not really an explanation of how we got where we are per se. It’s closer to a modern version of the Art of War and uses many of the lessons from the Art of War and others within the book.
Funny I’m actually working on a paper on the exact same topic. The historiography of Liddell Hart, especially his views of Sherman, is not without its critics. A WWI vet often referred to as the “Captain who taught Generals” Liddell Hart is widely credited as a visionary of blitzkrieg.
Ultimately however Liddell Hart and others overlook that it’s not just being indirect for its own sake but rather taking the “strategic” perspective over the “tactical.” Engaging the enemy on the battlefield is bloody and costly especially when the enemy is tactically superior to you. Eliminating his ability to fight is far more efficient. Usually an enemy’s military strength is a function of their economic strength, you attack their economic base and for moderate tactical investment you gain a much larger strategic return. This is exactly what Sherman does in the South.
Relevant to the war on terror…you can swat a fly with a sledge hammer, but eventually you’re going to run out of gas. It’s a sort of jiu-jitsu.
The paradigm of battle as it was fought even in WWII no longer is valid in an age of terror. There is no point in tactically engaging a stronger enemy unless you have something strategic to gain. This plays into many catch-phrases: “force multiplication”; “indirect action” etc but they all come to the same point.
You can engage an enemy force and wipe them off the earth, but it doesn’t always equal victory.
