I thought so. Which gave us the Walther P-5, Sig P-6, and HK P-7. Interesting.
I believe Munich was done with BGS, that was before GSG9.
From what I understand, after WW2, Germany wasn’t allowed to have a military special operations unit as part of some agreement. Had to do with the SS being considered there elite units at the time. After Munich in 72, they needed some kind of CT capability and so it was givin to their Border Protection, which were federal police and not military.
GSG9 helped train US special operations in hostage rescue/CQB back in the early 80s. They still cross train together today.
Germany’s KSK started around 1997. This was their first military special operations unit since WW2.
A neat piece of CT trivia. GSG-9 with their SAS advisers were the first to employ a stun grenade / flash bang in an operation . . .
That call came on Oct. 13, 1977, when four members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, calling themselves Commando Martyr Halime, hijacked Lufthansa Flight 181. En route from Palma de Mallorca to Frankfurt, with 91 passengers and crew on board, the 737 was crowded with tourists, including a number of participants from the Miss World beauty pageant. For five days, West Germany’s counter-terrorism unit, GSG-9, formed after the Munich Olympics disaster, tracked Lufthansa 181 across the skies of the Middle East, as politicians and hijackers tried to work out a negotiated solution. Two SAS operators, Maj. Alastair Morrison and Sgt. Barry Davies, secretly joined GSS-9 with a “bag of tricks” including flash-bangs.
The hijacking ended at Mogadishu on the night of Oct. 17/18, when at 0207 hours, Operation Feuerzauber (“Fire Magic”) was executed and GSG-9 stormed Lufthansa 181. Intelligence reports suggested that the hijackers had doused passengers with cigarette lighter fuel and liquor, and trials had shown that early flash bangs were especially prone to setting things alight. So GSG-9 did not use the SAS’s flash-bangs inside the aircraft cabin, in deference to the potential fire hazard. Instead, and in sync with the GSG-9 assault, Morrison and Davies threw G60s at the cockpit windscreen as diversions, drawing the hijackers away from GSG-9’s entry points. The diversion worked perfectly: The hijackers went to the front of the aircraft to see what was happening and the GSG-9 teams entered through the rear cabin doors. When the shooting stopped, three hijackers were dead and one wounded. All 90 passengers and the remaining crew were released. The SAS used flash-bangs on two other occasions, both involving hostages. One very public use was at the end of the siege of the Iranian Embassy in Central London in May 1980, (Operation Nimrod), and one non-public operation at Peterhead Prison in October 1987, where prison officers were held by rioting prisoners.
https://www.defensemedianetwork.com/stories/tools-of-the-trade-the-flash-bang-grenade/
Weren’t the SAS the first hostage rescue/counter terrorism SOF type units in the world? Then they passed their trade on to other friendly western forces like Delta, Team 6, GSG9, GROM ect?
NYH1.
For the most part, yes.
Cool, thanks.
NYH1.
Yes and no.
The action that put the SAS on the worlds stage was the Iran Embassy job which happened in 1980. Four years prior was Entebbe, which was a much more complex operation than the SAS had in the Iranian Embassy. Both events were critical in getting us to where we are today in counter terrorism.
1980 was also the year of the failed US hostage rescue attempt in Iran (“Eagle Claw”) that was the impetus for the formation of SOCOM.
Individual states were employing CT strategies way before they became popular in the media. SAS in Malaysia and Israel to name a couple. But when hijacking’s became de rigueur after the formation of the RAF, IRA, Black September, JAR, etc., they came up with new tactics, and the terrorist events exposed the mil/police units involved. That was a good thing because states became serious about sharing techniques. Of course, Iran/Eagle Claw really exposed our weaknesses.
A lot has been discussed over the years about Eagle Claw. The helicopter force, in particular, has been given a lot of blame. The RH-53D’s were flown by Navy pilots (because it was their aircraft and they were most familiar with the RH-53D) and co-piloted by Marines (the theory was that they had more experience operating over land). USAF HH-53 pilots were available who had Vietnam experience and had flown long range, low altitude missions during the war. They might have been the best choice, but gathering them together from all over the USAF for the mission was seen as an unacceptable security risk.
Col. Beckwith did not have a high opinion of them afterwards, referring to the helo crews as “cowards”, but then he was a pretty hard-driving individual.
Beckwith apologized later, admitting he was caught up in the moment. Our tactics were sound; the fact that four service branches were singing off separate sheets of music was not. USSOCOM didn’t do too much to change/improve specific tactics, but the fact everyone was on the same page was an evolutionary leap of significant proportions in terms of creating “jointness” and uniformity.
It’s interesting to speculate all these years later. If enough helicopters had remained serviceable at Desert One (and no collision had happened, obviously), would the mission had succeeded if it had gone forward? Despite having a lot of moving parts, Beckwith and many others thought it had a better than even chance. The rescue personnel certainly had the training and motivation to make it succeed.
I read The Guts to Try: The Untold Story of the Iran Hostage Rescue Mission by the On-Scene Desert Commander. The author believed the same thing, that had everything gone as planned it had a good chance of being successful. If I recall he also said that because there were so many moving parts, of one thing broke down it could cause a domino effect and it wouldn’t take much to impact the mission.
Edited to add, I was a young buck when it happened (12), but it impacted me very much, and because of it, Grenada and Beirut three years later, I joined the military.
I read that also. Great book (by Col. Jim Kyle, IIRC?).
Failures always show where you are weak and many times bring about a fresh approach. Ma’alot was Israel’s failure and brought about the creation of a dedicated hostage rescue unit.
Seems a little incongruous to state that it had a better than even chance whilst still having a lot of moving parts.
Better than even chance Ronald Reagan doesn’t get elected in '80 if the raid had gone off successfully.
Iran was relatively small potatoes for most people. In 1980, it was mostly a referendum about the economy. I am certain that had the raid succeeded, his margin of victory may have been much smaller.
They had rehearsed the op several times, and got it down pretty pat. Of course, what might have happened or could have happened in Iran and on the way out will always be speculation. But based on rehearsals it’s fair to say that getting to the embassy had a high probability of success.
Why does this stuff interest folks?
A cheeky part of me wants to say “cosplay/LARP ideas” but to me its like guys memorizing college football stats or Star Trek people.
I’m glad these people do what they do, but I’m not these people and it don’t concern me unless I get held hostage in Berlin. But I wouldnt be a good hostage because I would show my natural ass