Explains some of the changes that occurred along the way…
[video=youtube_share;AI_kSWMtdvg]https://youtu.be/AI_kSWMtdvg?si=mXwJmVKO-PnEupkT[/video]
As with most of his videos, plenty of inaccuracies (the XM16E1s had been used in combat well before Ia Drang, namely the 82nd ABN in the Dominican Republic and with the 173rd ABN in Vietnam), mischaracterizations (McNamara was most certainly not willing to wait for the Army to “militarize” the AR-15, having cancelled M14 production before picking an alternative) and biased simplifications (the entire argument that the Ordnance Corps was willing to sacrifice lives in order to get their M14s back.) Additionally, ball powder was not something new the Army introduced to sabotage the new rifle they had been saddled with, but rather the standard military powder since Korea. Finally, he’s free to not like the forward assist on the AR, but saying that it is completely useless is just ignorant. We have a high profile case where the individual involved (Kyle Rittenhouse) made use of the forward assist.
It’s an interesting subject matter, it’s just a shame that the content creator has such an axe to grind he lets it color how he presents facts. If anyone is interested in the subject matter, I’d recommend Bob Orkand and Lyman Duryea’s Misfire: The Tragic Failure of the M16 in Vietnam. I don’t think it’s perfect, and I disagree with some of their conclusions, but it does a better job of analyzing the situation and facts.
IMR 4475 was the original propellant used in .223/5.56mm. Where is that propellant today? Can you get a can of it? Does any company or military use it in .223/5.56mm?
NO.
Why?
IMR 4475 was originally developed for 7.62mm ammunition as an alternative to WC846. However, IMR 4475 had a bad tendency to show excessive pressure when loaded in M80 ball ammunition. For this reason the Army discontinued its use in 7.62mm. Guess what, IMR 4475 showed the same tendencies for high pressures in .223/5.56mm ammunition. Du Pont ceased production of it for these reasons.
And another thing, Ordnance Department did not set the requirements for small arms. The Ordnance Department did not decide what small arms were adopted. The Infantry Board set the requirements, and the Infantry Board recommends what small arms they feel are suitable for infantry use. The Chief of Staff of the Army has the final decision authority. The job of the Ordnance Department was to take the Infantry’s requirements and develop a weapon around them either in-house (as with the M14 and M73), through contracting it out (as with the M60, M39 and M61), or purchasing a suitable design (FAL/T48, or M1/M2/M3 20mm). Operational testing is also not done by Ordnance, but at the time also done by the Infantry Board. Testing at Aberdeen Proving Grounds is not operational testing, this testing does judge the item to the set requirements, but only to the extend that recommendations are made to correct deficiencies.
In short Ordnance was not in a position to push the AR-15 for adoption nor was it in a position to prevent it, except by showing through engineering testing that the design was incapable of meeting the Infantry’s requirements. The few tests done by Springfield and APG were quite positive about the AR-15’s performance. The only “unkind” things in the reports were the usual things undeveloped firearms, and offered suggested remedies. Further testing (denied by the SecDef) would have exposed all of the weaknesses in the design (bolt bounce, ammunition incompatibility, rifling, maintenance requirements, etc, etc).
Why was the testing denied?
How long was the M16A1 in service?
I’ve never read much about the usage of it in 7.62 ammo, but wasn’t it more due to “erratic” pressures in 5.56? Which naturally would include instances of “excessive” pressure.
The Black Rifle: M16 Retrospective is a good book on the history and development of the M16.
The “Report of the M16 Rifle Review Panel” published in June 1968 is a fairly concise history of the M16 rifle (and it’s issues) up to that point. Recommended for the history buffs:
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA953110.pdf
…and product improvements:
IME, SAS has been full of equal parts bs and fact. The scale tipping towards bs. The guy is clearly biased and spouts more fudd nonsense than most of his gun tuber peers.
I was always surprised by how much and who recommended him. I already have enough of my own bias without adding any of his.
The use of IMR 4475 in 7.62mm ended about the same time as it stopped being used in 5.56mm, and largely for the same reasons.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) was sold on the misguided belief that the AR-15 was a “fully developed system”, and put out a memo stating that no testing would be done, except what they approved, which was very little. Frankford Arsenal stated at the meeting that the propellant change was first floated that they thought it would be reckless to change propellant without testing to see if there was any adverse effects. The request for testing was shot down immediately. Yet people like this guy continue to parrot, ". . . it was the Army’s fault for the powder change. . . "
Any idea why Mr Stoner developed the AR around IMR 4475?
That is an excellent book for the facts, but the authors try to tell a false “story” with heroes and villains. The choice of “villains” is, of course the Army, in general and Dr Fred Carten in particular. In order to weave this “story” they do not present the facts in a strictly linear time line, but place some events out-of-time to try and imply the were sinister motives afoot . . .
One incident that best exemplifies this is the “water-in-bore” discussion. The AR-15 during rain testing in 1960 had an over-pressure incident. This was reported to both the Ordnance and the Infantry Board as a possible problem that needed to be addressed before the rifle be considered suitable for infantry use. Stevens and Ezell make a big deal about this being Dr. Carten seizing on a minor flaw and trying to kill the AR-15. They can do this because here in the future, we know that water in the bore can be drained by cracking the breech about a 1/2 inch, and out the water flows. But in 1960, nobody knew this. Nobody had ever intentionally filled a .22 caliber barrel and tried to drain it, and further, a .22 caliber bore will not self drain, the surface tension, weight of water and volume available cannot pull enough vacuum or allow air to bubble past the blockage. In order to self drain, you have to have a 1/4 inch bore of bigger. Dr. Carten did what any sensible manager would do: he asked the question is this correctable (and funded the quick study to get the answer, which they did), and looked to alternative calibers if it was an insolvable problem. The authors present this episode as Carten making a mountain out of a mole hill, and trying to force a change of caliber (and they completely ignore the fact the Infantry Board were the ones that brought up the idea of a .25 caliber AR).
EDIT:
If you have the pdf version of the book whose first page is a white title page, I have a set of comments that can be attached to it that discuss the issues I have with the book.
“The Air Force technical data package required the use of IMR 4475, and specified the velocity of 3250 plus or minus 40 feet per second, and the chamber pressure of 52,000 pounds per square inch (the commercial specifications). These requirements were also contained in the 16 August 1963 proposal for procurement of one million rounds of M193 ball cartridges. Both Olin Mathieson and Remington Arms, the two eligible bidders, took exception to provisions of the technical data package, but at the time, had no objection to the use of IMR 4475 propellant.”
That quote does not answer the question, as the Air Force Data Package was written around Stoner’s 1957-58 design.
Only Stoner could answer that question, but I am going to guess, because after initial outlines and calculation on chamber volumes and such, Armalite turned the development of the “.222 Special” over to Remington, who refined the cartridge and fixed a few problems. And, they would be inclined to use their own propellants, the only IMR in the required energy density and burn rate range (at the time) would be IMR 4475.
Since both Stoner and Remington originally cooperated on the development of the round, it’s possible that Remington’s engineers suggested the use of IMR 4476.
What year was the M16A2 adopted?
Yeah, he so consistently spouts BS, I’m surprised he continues to be shared around as much as he is. I’d have thought at a certain extent, word would get out that he’s full of it.
I think people always forget this fact, as well as the idea that the AR-15 design was supposed to be a short term, interim solution until the “next gen” solution was developed in a couple of years. If the bean counters and Whiz Kids had any idea of how much R&D the AR/XM16 really needed, I wonder if the M-14 would have been cancelled when it was thus necessitating the “one time buy” of Colt’s ARs.
The Smithsonian did an over 4 hour long interview with Stoner in 1988 on the development of the M16 - including the M16A2.
He discusses all of the issues in this thread, as well as the attempts by some leaders to torpedo the rifle during the winter testing in Alaska. You can watch the interview here.
https://youtube.com/playlist?list=PLOSc8D2U-Hf6i9FT7ZzVpKZVDBsS6b3Ub&si=7eTwcBhm5YY0ec8L
[video=youtube_share;kaIU0nCxwGg]https://youtu.be/kaIU0nCxwGg?si=NP5Dt-PgMkXDcgQC[/video]
The “next best thing” was supposed to be the Special Purpose Individual Weapon (SPIW), which fired flechettes, or some such. It turned out to be a dead end.