One of the best books on the early history and development of the AR15/M16 is “The Black Rifle – M16 Retrospective,” by R. Blake Stevens and Edward C. Ezell. In my opinion, it is a ‘must read’ for any student of the AR15/M16. In the last paragraph of the foreword Stevens states:
“Outrageous untruths become more like "gospel" with each retelling in this atmosphere of misinformation, to the point where the true story of the Black Rifle, as it emerges for the first time in these pages, will quite likely surprise most readers.” (1)
Unfortunately, untruths alone are not all that spread misinformation. A biased author (or authors, in this case) can, and do, create a distorted picture of history. So, while they might claim that their book contains no untruths, it does just as bad an evil by slanting the facts so that the reader walks away with an incorrect view of things.
The first and major problem is one I have seen in many “history” books, and that is the perceived need to “tell a story,” rather than “present history”. Stories have heroes and villains, conflict, rising action, a climax, and the denouement; history rarely has these elements. History authors prefer to tell stories, because stories are more interesting and engaging, you get to cheer for the plucky under-dog hero who pits his invention against the evil, uncaring, bureaucratic, monster, and we can celebrate when he wins. In reality, history is rarely a story, but that does not mean it cannot be interesting.
One of the big things this book tries to hammer into your head is that the Army, specifically the Ordnance Department, and super-specifically, Dr Fredrick H. Carten did not want the AR-15, and continually tried to torpedo the program. This sets up who the evil villains are, and you can guess who the hero is are going to be. Now, aside from the simple fact that the Ordnance Department is not who decides what weapons the Infantry gets, that is the purview of the Infantry Board, the Ordnance Department, and Army in general, was very receptive to the AR-15, and the .22 caliber bullet, as a combat weapon.
For brevity sake I am not going to relate all the research funded by the Ordnance Department and the Infantry Board on .22 caliber and other Small Caliber High Velocity (SCHV) weapons, and skip to a single report that shows what the prevailing view of .22 caliber weapons really was.
For those that may not know, the Lightweight Rifle Program was the project that tested the T44 (M14) against the T48 (FAL), and eventually lead to the M14 being formally adopted in 1957. The program started in 1952, and each summer and winter hundreds of thousands of rounds were expended testing the two prototypes, with the failures and deficiencies noted to be corrected for the next round of tests. While hideously expensive, the results were that by 1956, both the M14 and the FAL were probably the most reliable and durable rifles in the world. So, finally after seven rounds of testing over four years the final report on the T44/T48 competition was published. So, which one was recommended for adoption? I will quote the report:
“3. It is recommended that:
a. Neither the T44 nor the T48 type rifle be adopted for Army use.
b. A truly lightweight rifle system wherein all or most shoulder fired Weapons are replaced by a single weapon with light and heavy barrel versions (if required) remain as a development objective.
c. A lightweight ultrahigh velocity small caliber rifle be developed on the following time schedule:” (2)
It then goes on to outline a recommended detailed development schedule, of which I will only note three milestone dates, June 1957 - cartridge development, July 1957 – Industry-wide rifle development competition, July 1958 – engineer/user competitive tests.
The Infantry School goes even further with their comments:
"This phase of the rifle development program, directed toward the attainment of a lightweight rifle system, has produced rifle systems that closely meet the previously established military characteristics; however, these rifle systems do not meet the requirements for a lightweight rifle during the latter part of the 1960-70 period as established in the Combat Developments Objective Guide, dated 1 May 1956. Further, it is believed that the T44 and T48 (FN) rifles offer no more than marginal improvement over the present system in range, accuracy, lethality, ballistics and weightwise, except in the case of the BAR which is approximately six pounds heavier than either the T44 or T48 HB variants. Consequently, in view of the Army's stated policy to refrain from mere product improvement, and the inability of our program as yet to produce a truly lightweight rifle with an increased casualty producing capability. The infantry School recommends that:
"a. The T44 rifle system be considered an 'on-the-shelf' item for national emergency production in the event its use is required prior to development of an optimum 'individual weapon,' and that concentrated developmental effort (funds and technical skill) be directed toward the expeditious attainment of the optimum individual weapon of radical or advance design.
"b. If due to standardization commitments [sic], it is considered imperative to adopt a lightweight rifle system at this time, the T44 rifle system be adopted, and development effort be continued toward the attainment of the optimum Individual weapon of radical or advance design." (2)
The Secretary of the Army, and the Ordnance Department took these recommendations to heart. A new rifle was required, as the M1 Garand was definitely long in the tooth and its limitations by this time, increasingly apparent. Standardization issues were also considered imperative, as by 1956, the 7.62mm NATO cartridge had been standardized for two years, but no U.S weapon was fielded in this caliber, while both Canada and the U.K. had adopted the FAL and began working on converting BRENs and M1919s. Even the Germans were ordering G-1 rifles in 7.62mm NATO. In 1957 both the M14 and M60, both in 7.62mm NATO, were standardized by the U.S.. What also happened in that year was the U.S. Army Infantry Board finalized the Military Characteristics Requirements for a Small Caliber High Velocity (SCHV) Rifle and associated ammunition, Springfield Armory contracted Remington Arms to produce a .224 caliber cartridge based on a lengthened .222 Remington case (this cartridge was initially labeled .224 Springfield, later marketed by Remington as “.222 Magnum”), and later that year, Armalite would order from Remington some .222 Special ammunition of Stoner’s design.
In the middle of 1958 competitive tests of the Armalite AR-15, Winchester’s .224 “Lightweight Military Rifle”, and the T44/M14 were held at both Aberdeen Proving Grounds and at Fort Benning. From these tests the Armalite design was judged superior in many aspects, and in need of further development in other areas, but generally a positive review.
Right on schedule with what was proposed by CONARC in 1956. However, with the M14 entering production more engineering and monetary resources were needed with that program, the SCHV was placed on hold, besides its intended fielding date was the around 1970, so it was not and urgent program. And, who knew if maybe the .17 caliber flechette thing, or SALVO would prove superior. Since the AR-15 was the property of a commercial vendor (it had just been sold to Colt's), and they had the list of deficiencies and shortcomings revealed in testing, the Army was not required to be involved with further development at this time.
Being on the back-burner is very different from being unwanted.
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1) “The Black Rifle, M16 Retrospective” R. Blake Stevens and Edward C. Ezell, Collector Grade Publications, Ontario, 1994
2) “Service Test of Lightweight Rifles,” Headquarters, Continental Army Command, Ft Monroe, Virginia, 20 June 1956)
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Originally Posted by Stickman
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